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Product-Related Risk and Cognitive
Biases: The Shortcomings of
Enterprise Liability
James A. Henderson, Jr.* & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski**
I. INTRODUCTION
Risk is ubiquitous. People face not only a bewildering array of
hazards, but also precautions that purport to reduce them. Manu-
facturers complicate people's efforts to determine which hazards to
accept and which to avoid with advertising designed to encourage
people to use products that create risk and to purchase safety pre-
cautions. Much of this advertising works at cross purposes. A typ-
ical television viewer might watch an advertisement encouraging
her to endure the risks of downhill skiing followed by one admon-
ishing her to purchase an expensive set of radial tires that provide
some marginal degree of protection against the risk of an automo-
bile accident (presumably while driving to a ski resort). Commer-
cials hawking products with known cancer risks, such as beer and
coffee, often follow ads for breakfast cereals that "may reduce the
risks of some kinds of cancer." (The ideal breakfast would presum-
ably be a bowl of oat bran accompanied by several cups of strong
coffee.)
This barrage of mixed messages, combined with an underlying
dearth of public information about risk and a plethora of cognitive
impediments to accurate risk assessment, ensures that consumers
cannot make choices that result in anything like optimal levels of
product-related safety. People's incomplete and inaccurate under-
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standing of risk confounds efforts to identify the system of products
liability that would best encourage appropriate patterns of product
design, production, marketing, use and consumption. Liability
rules affect all of these elements and they all interact with one an-
other.' Given these realities, the regulator's task seems hopeless.
Despite the difficulties, a few basic observations are generally
well-accepted in the literature on products liability law. Manufac-
turers know more about their products than do consumers, which
justifies imposing some liability on manufacturers. Absent con-
straints, manufacturers would be able to use their superior knowl-
edge to dupe, and thereby harm, consumers.2 Consumers,
however, have more control over how they use their products than
do manufacturers, which justifies limitations on manufacturer's li-
ability.3 Requiring manufacturers to serve as absolute insurers
would impose liability on manufacturers for harm that could better
be prevented by consumers.4
These issues are hardly novel. The courts and academic com-
mentators have long struggled to develop sensible products-liabil-
ity rules that address the relative ability of manufacturers and
consumers to identify and respond appropriately to risk.5 At pre-
sent, the common-law torts process provides a reasonably clear
1. For a general treatment of the authors' systems approach, see Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 479, 482-88 (1997). As
support for systems analysis, LoPucki relies upon Ervin Laszlo, Introduction To
Systems Philosophy 10-21 (1972), which describes the methodological and concep-
tual foundations of systems philosophy and proposes a systems analysis in which
the interdependent elements of each system are understood as systems-in-environ-
ments, creating a hierarchy of ever more inclusive systems.
2. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, A Positive Economic Theory
of Products Liability, 14 J. Legal Stud. 535, 544-45 (1985). But see Richard A.
Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Products Liability Law, 10 Cardozo L. Rev.
2193, 2204-05 (1989) (criticizing this assertion).
3. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American
Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1263, 1283-84 (1991) [hereinafter Henderson & Twerski I]; Landes & Posner,
supra note 2, at 549-50.
4. See George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 Yale
L.J. 1297, 1313-19 (1981).
5. See generally George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A
Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modem Tort Law, 14 J. Legal
Stud. 461 (1985) (reviewing the evolution of these concepts in tort law).
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rule governing manufacturers liability.6 Regarding commercially
distributed products, manufacturers are responsible-are liable in
tort-for all injuries caused by product defects-production errors
and unreasonably unsafe product designs and marketing. Con-
sumers are responsible for the rest.7 Liability for manufacturing
defects is strict. Manufacturers' liability for generic product
hazards depends upon a finding that they have done something
negligent-either by designing products improperly or failing to
warn of the dangers products pose.8 Despite "strict liability" rheto-
ric in some scholarship and judicial opinions, manufacturers' lia-
bility for product design and marketing traditionally requires a
finding of fault.9
Numerous legal scholars have proposed alternatives to the
traditional fault-based system for generic product hazards.10 The
most commonly advanced reform over the last three decades is
that of eliminating the role of fault and holding manufacturers
strictly liable for all of the harm their products cause. A system of
strict manufacturers' liability for all product-caused harm is com-
monly referred to as enterprise liability ("EL").11 In a system of
EL, liability flows from the brute fact of commercially distributing
6. See Henderson & Twerski I, supra note 3, at 1329-31; James A. Henderson
& Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective Product Design, 83 Cornell
L. Rev. 867 (1998) [hereinafter Henderson & Twerski Ill.
7. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 17 (1998); Henderson &
Twerski I, supra note 3, at 1284.
8. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 2 cmts. d, i (1998). See also
Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 593 (arguing that even
though courts claim to impose a strict liability standard for products liability, the
test is really no more than a traditional negligence standard); Henderson & Twer-
ski II, supra note 6, at 868-72 (suggesting the misconception that the standard for
defective product design is unsettled, incorrect and unnecessary).
9. See Henderson & Twerski II, supra note 6, at 868-72.
10. See Priest, supra note 5, at 519-27. See generally Stephen P. Croley & Jon
D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revisited Case for Enterprise Liability, 91
Mich. L. Rev. 683, 692-95 (1993) (discussing different liability rules); James A.
Henderson, Jr., The Efficacy of Organic Tort Reform, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 596 (1992)
(reviewing the strict liability tort reform proposals offered by W. Kip Viscusi, Re-
forming Products Liability (1991)); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability
Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 Yale L.J. 353 (1988) (using the theories of tort
and contract to overcome products liability problems).
11. See Priest, supra note 5, at 462-64.
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a particular product rather than from failing to ensure that the
product is reasonably safe.12
Most scholarship comparing fault-based liability and EL con-
cludes that, at least in theory, both systems create the same incen-
tives for manufacturers to invest in product safety. 13 Both systems
pressure manufacturers to incorporate optimal cost-effective pre-
cautions into their products. 14 Law-and-economics scholars also
argue that for goods that are consumed quickly (non-durables), the
choice between negligence and strict liability would not (with per-
fect information by manufacturers and consumers) affect the level
of product consumption. 15 Putting aside difficulties in implemen-
tation,16 policy concerns have discouraged widespread adoption of
the EL system because it undermines consumer incentives to avoid
accidents. Under an EL system, manufacturers must compensate
consumers for all of the harm that products cause, thereby signifi-
cantly reducing incentives for consumers to avoid inefficiently dan-
gerous patterns of product use and consumption.' 7 Manufacturers
are generally better able to identify efficient safety precautions,
but consumers are often in a better position to assess not only how
to use or consume a product but whether to do so in the first place.
12. For an enlightening exchange regarding the claim that enterprise liability
is, at its most basic level, a means to hold manufacturers strictly liable for all
injuries caused by their products, see Geistfeld, supra note 12; Henderson & Twer-
ski I, supra note 3; James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The Un-
workability of Court-Made Enterprise Liability: A Reply to Geistfeld, 67 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1174 (1992).
13. See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1,
7-8 (1980).
14. See id.
15. See id. Shavell's analysis, however, assumes that products pose essen-
tially the same risks to all consumers. If a product puts some consumers at much
greater risk than most, then these consumers will only purchase the product under
a strict-liability regime.
16. See Henderson & Twerski I, supra note 3, at 1279-86. For a discussion of
the prohibitive difficulties that characterize widespread implementation of enter-
prise liability, see infra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
17. See Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 549-50. The existing system of
product liability, with its contributive and comparative fault provisions, requires
that designers must anticipate foreseeable user misconduct and consider this po-
tential for foolish behavior when they design the product. See James A. Henderson
& Aaron D. Twerski, Products Liability: Problems and Process 271-72 (4th ed.
2000).
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Supplementing EL with a contributory negligence defense would
mitigate, but by no means eliminate, these difficulties.' 8
Recently, some legal scholars have developed a new rhetorical
weapon supporting the adoption of EL.19 These scholars argue
that manufacturers employ advertising techniques in ways that
completely undermine the justifications for retaining a fault-based
liability system. They contend that manufacturers rely on adver-
tising to induce consumers to disregard the risks that many prod-
ucts pose.20 The ability of manufacturers to manipulate consumer
preferences suggests to these scholars that manufacturers are not
only in the best position to assess safety precautions, but are also
in the best position to determine the socially efficient rates at
which products are used and consumed. These claims, if true, sup-
port adopting EL. Such a system, these scholars argue, would
eliminate incentives for manufacturers to induce people to con-
sume products inefficiently. Consequently, the scholars developing
this new rhetoric assert that adopting EL is necessary to give man-
ufacturers adequate incentives to refrain from manipulating con-
sumers in socially destructive ways.
18. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 17 cmt. a (1998) (identify-
ing the three main issues in a products liability action involving consumer misuse,
alteration, and modification of a product: (1) determining whether the product is
defective; (2) determining the legal cause; and (3) determining whether plaintiffs
conduct constitutes contributory fault, and thus should reduce the plaintiff's recov-
ery under the rules of comparative responsibility); Henderson & Twerski I, supra
note 3, at 1283-84.
19. The two principal papers in this line of work are Jon D. Hanson & Douglas
A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation,
74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 630, 715 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar I]; Jon D. Hanson
& Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market
Manipulation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1420 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar III.
Several other papers develop arguments that are similar, or related, to those made
in these two papers. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 10; Mark Geistfeld, Imple-
menting Enterprise Liability: A Comment on Henderson and Twerski, 67 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1157 (1992); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Ex-
ternality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 129
(1990); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic
Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 1163 (1998); Mark
Geistfeld, Note, Imperfect Information, the Pricing Mechanism, and Products Lia-
bility 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1057 (1988). The papers also draw on work by Professor
Howard Latin. See Howard A. Latin, "Good Warnings", Bad Products, and Cogni-
tive Limitations, 41 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1193 (1994); Howard Latin, Problem-Solving
Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 677 (1985).
20. See Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 19, at 724-43; Hanson & Kysar II, supra
note 19, at 1425-27.
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The new rhetoric supporting EL has superficial appeal. It re-
lies on well-documented psychological insights into human deci-
sion-making and tells a simple, clever story. It has even found
limited acceptance in some courts.21 The argument espoused by
the new rhetoric, however, is ultimately unpersuasive. It provides
no quantitative assessment of the extent of the problem it purports
to identify, fails to take account of the existing legal mechanisms
available to address the manipulation of consumers and does not
even attempt to address the practical problems presented by a
strict liability system for products. These difficulties cannot be dis-
missed as mere trifles. Absent sensible responses to these con-
cerns, courts and legislatures should not-and we predict will
not-seriously consider adopting an EL system.
Furthermore, on its own terms, the new rhetoric advocating
EL fails to "take behavioralism 22 seriously" by ignoring the fact
that the manipulation of consumers is a two-way street.23 Al-
though several cognitive processes lead people to underestimate
and under-react to risk, as EL's new proponents observe,24 many
other cognitive processes produce the opposite result.25 Conse-
quently, just as some manufacturers most certainly attempt to in-
duce consumers to behave as if a product is safer than it appears,
21. See also Lorrillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 84 F. Supp. 2d 180, 187 (D. Mass.
2000); In re Number Nine Visual Tech. Corp. Secs. Litig., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1, 20 (D.
Mass. 1999) ("lit is hardly surprising that markets sometimes fail to exhibit per-
fectly wealth-maximizing behavior, given the plethora of evidence from cognitive
psychologists and decision theorists suggesting that humans frequently behave in
nonrational ways, and that these 'cognitive biases' are largely incapable of being
unlearned."). See also Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1247 (1999)
(holding that when "mass marketing of prescription drugs seeks to influence a pa-
tient's choice of a drug, a pharmaceutical manufacturer that makes direct claims
to consumers for the efficacy of its product should not be unqualifiedly relieved of a
duty to provide proper warnings of the dangers or side effects of the product.").
22. The term, "behavioralism," is inappropriate in this context. The psycholog-
ical research that Professors Hanson and Kysar rely on arises from cognitive, not
behavioral, psychology. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology:
A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 739, 740
(2000). Behavioral psychology can be closely tied to micro-economic theory, which
cognitive psychology can be used to critique. See id.
23. See Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical
Synthesis, 97 Yale L.J. 353, 380-83 (1988) (psychological research shows both un-
derestimation and overestimation of risk).
24. See Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 19, at 696-704.
25. See id. at 704-14.
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others no less certainly attempt to induce consumers to behave as
if a product is more dangerous than it appears.
EL's new proponents argue that EL would force manufactur-
ers to set prices that reflect the true risk products pose and refrain
from manipulative advertising about risk, as there would be no
profit in it.26 What they disregard is the possibility, indeed the
certainty, that under an EL regime, manufacturers would induce
consumers to purchase extra safety precautions to reduce the risk
of accidents. EL's new proponents would have us believe that the
same consumers who misunderstand safety, risk and their own
preferences, somehow perfectly understand that the legal system
forces manufacturers to cover them for the injuries products pose.
We think not. Rather, we argue that, under EL, consumers would
be purchasing insurance against product-related injury, but would
also remain ignorant of this insurance (perhaps with the help of
manipulative advertising by those manufacturers who sell excess
safety). Thus, EL would aggravate the incentives that manufac-
turers already face to exaggerate the risks products pose, resulting
in a social excess of safety precautions.
This paper addresses the new rhetoric supporting EL. Part I
describes the argument, advanced by the new proponents of EL,
that relies on consumer psychology. Part II outlines the practical
shortcomings of the new rhetoric: its failure to demonstrate the ex-
tent of the social problem that the manipulation of consumers al-
legedly creates, its failure to acknowledge existing legal
mechanisms for remedying the manipulation of consumers and its
failure to address any of the problems that a system of strict liabil-
ity for products would create. Part III shows that, even apart from
these failings, the fact that manufacturers manipulate consumers
does not support adopting a system of EL. Such a reform would
exacerbate manufacturers' abilities to over-play risk and sell an
excess of safety. Part IV offers conclusions on the merits of EL in a
world in which manufacturers attempt to manipulate consumers'
beliefs about risk.
II. THE NEw RHETORIC: COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND EL
Research on the psychology of human judgment and choice has
inspired a new critique of fault-based liability. This research sug-
26. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 19, at 1555-58.
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gests that manufacturers can influence consumer decision-mak-
ing.27 Proponents of EL assert that tort law should recognize this
influence and that such a recognition would undermine the justifi-
cations for the traditional role that fault plays in determining
liability. 28
A. Cognitive Psychology and Manufacturer Manipulation of
Consumers
Over the past half-century, psychologists have developed a
model of human thought that describes the brain as a highly adap-
tive, but limited, information processor.29 Incapable of fully
processing all of the stimuli it encounters, the brain relies on cogni-
tive shortcuts, or heuristics.30 These heuristics work well in most
circumstances, but can sometimes produce errors and illusions.31
Certain patterns of stimuli fool human visual perception, memory
and judgment into seeing things that are not really present, re-
membering events that did not actually occur, and making errone-
ous decisions.32 People may try to make choices that are rational,
but the brain's efforts to cope with information overload creates
predictable patterns of mistakes.33
For example, consider the problem people face trying to deter-
mine whether some technological activity creates a cancer risk.
Specifically, imagine a couple, deciding whether to buy a house
near high-tension power lines, who must judge whether such lines
fall within the category of objects that pose a cancer risk for their
children. Categorical judgments like this have been widely studied
by psychologists.34 These studies reveal that people make such
27. See Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 19, at 724-43.
28. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 19, at 1424-25.
29. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuris-
tics and Biases (1982); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Reality of Cog-
nitive Illusions, 103 Psychol. Rev. 852 (1996).
30. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 1124, 1124 (1974).
31. See id.
32. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or
Adaptation?, Or. L. Rev. (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with authors).
33. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation,
70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 113, 118 (1996).
34. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahnexnan, Judgments of and By Representa-
tiveness, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 84 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
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judgments primarily by assessing the degree to which the object or
event in question resembles prototypes clearly within the relevant
category, disregarding statistical evidence in the process. When
the activity-here, the power company's maintenance of the power
lines-appears superficially similar to the prototypes-operation
of x-ray machines, for example-people judge the likelihood that
the activity is in the category as high; when the activity does not
seem similar to prototypes in the category, people judge the likeli-
hood that the activity is within the category as low. Psychologists
refer to this decision-making strategy as the representativeness
heuristic. 35 In this example, if high-tension power lines strike
most people to be similar (or analogous) to x-ray machines, against
which lead shields are often appropriate protections, then such
power lines will be believed to cause cancer.
The representativeness heuristic is a useful shortcut under
most circumstances. The heuristic basically consists of assuming
that if an animal looks like a duck, walks like a duck and quacks
like a duck, then it's a duck. The problem is that this heuristic
often leads to sloppy decision-making because it allows people to
ignore the possibility that the so-called duck was drawn from a
group of wildfowl that consist mostly of geese. To complete the ex-
ample of the high-tension power lines, the couple might readily as-
sociate such lines with x-ray machines. The couple might also be
suspicious of government reports that hazards "like this" are per-
fectly safe,36 and might conclude intuitively that the tension lines
simply have the look and feel of other technological sources of can-
cer. It might never occur to the couple to consult statistical studies
of the correlation between living near such wires and the risk of
contracting cancer. 37 Indeed, so strong is the heuristic that they
might disbelieve available and otherwise credible studies showing
power lines not to be cancer-causing.38
Advertisers know well how to take advantage of the
representativness heuristic. For example, one widely run televi-
35. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction,
80 Psychol. Rev. 237 (1973).
36. See Paul Slovic, Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy, 13 Risk Analysis
675 (1993).
37. See Donald G. MacGregor et al., Perception of Risks From Electromagnetic
Fields: A Psychometric Evaluation of a Risk-Communication Approach, 14 Risk
Analysis 815, 827-28 (1994).
38. See id.
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sion advertisement for an analgesic leads with an educated-looking
man speaking to viewers about the benefits of the product. He
lauds its ability to deaden pain more rapidly than competing prod-
ucts and announces that numerous statistical studies reveal that it
is the most effective pain reliever available. In the end, however,
he announces that he pays no attention to these studies, and as-
serts that he knows the product works because he uses it. Never
mind how improbable it would be that he could properly conduct
the kind of careful, unbiased self-observation required to identify
the marginal benefits of the product accurately. He encourages
viewers to rely on the observation that, after they take the pill,
their pain will usually diminish.3 9 Advertisements such as these
take advantage of natural, but sometimes erroneous, decision-
making strategies.
Heuristics aside, the brain frequently does not even attempt to
assess the value of certain kinds of information in an organized,
rational fashion. In this regard, the brain seems to have both a
rational side, which is efficient but sometimes inaccurate, and an
emotional side, which does not even attempt logical, ordered deci-
sion-making.40 Certain stimuli elicit powerful affective responses,
even without much higher cognitive processing. 41 This affective
response then guides subsequent cognitive processing, creating
"motivated inferences."42 For example, one study reveals that peo-
ple prefer hamburger described as "75% fat free" over a hamburger
described as "consisting of 25% fat."43 The phrase "fat free" seems
to attract a positive feeling from consumers that translates into a
39. See Thomas Gilovich, How We Know What Isn't So: The Fallibility of
Human Reasoning in Everyday Life 30-48 (1991) (describing people's tendency to
rely too heavily on confirmatory evidence).
40. See, e.g., Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the
Human Brain (1994); Steven A. Sloman, The Empirical Case for Two Systems of
Reasoning, 119 Psychol. Bull. 3 (1996); Robert B. Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking:
Closing the Debate Over the Independence of Affect, in Feeling and Thinking: The
Role of Affect in Social Cognition. Studies in Emotion and Social Interaction, Sec-
ond Series 31 (Joseph P. Forgas et al. eds., 2000).
41. See Robert B. Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need no Infer-
ences, 35 Am. Psychol. 151, 154-56 (1980).
42. See, e.g., Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 Psychol.
Bull. 480 (1990); Ziva Kunda, Motivated Inference: Self-Serving Generation and
Evaluation of Causal Theories, 53 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 636 (1987).
43. Irwin P. Levin & Gary J. Gaeth, How Consumers Are Affected by the
Framing of Attribute Information Before and After Consuming the Product, 15 J.
Consumer Res. 374 (1988).
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more positive reaction towards the product, whereas the idea of a
product being 25% fat seems inherently unappealing. Even those
who undertake the extra cognitive processing required to reach the
added inference that the 75% fat-free product actually consists of
25% fat do so in the shadow of the initial positive reaction.
It should come as no surprise that manufacturers self-con-
sciously conform their marketing techniques to match the intrica-
cies of human judgment and thought. Businesses spend huge
sums each year on advertising." Few believe that this spending is
simply an attempt to inform or remind consumers of the availabil-
ity of various products.45 Competitive forces require that manufac-
turers press every means of selling their products. 46 Such means
surely include exploitation of consumers' cognitive limitations and
affective vulnerabilities.
In the two principal papers that review the psychological re-
search supporting the new rhetoric, Professors Hanson and Kysar
identify several ways that manufacturers have used cognitive bi-
ases to manipulate consumers' perception of or attentiveness to
risk.47 For example, they contend that because consumers gener-
ally overestimate their own abilities to keep themselves safe, man-
ufacturers can run advertisements that play to people's beliefs that
they can control random events.48 They identify a television ad-
vertisement usually depicting a sport-utility vehicle miraculously
dodging hazards such as rock slides and overturned trucks as one
instance of such an effort.49 They also assert that manufacturers
trick people's risk assessments by ensuring that their memories
include many vivid examples of a product's benefits and few exam-
ples of a product's downside risks.50 As an example, they note that
alcoholic beverage advertisements commonly provide memorable
descriptions of the potential good times and fun that might accom-
pany alcohol consumption, perhaps leading consumers to underes-
timate the problems also associated with alcohol. 61 They also
44. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 19, at 1429-30 (reporting that busi-
nesses spend $350 billion on advertising each year).
45. See id. at 1438-39.
46. See Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 19, at 726.
47. See id. at 721-43; Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 19, at 1428-67.
48. Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 19, at 729-30.
49. See id. at 730.
50. See id. at 731-32.
51. See id. at 731.
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argue that manufacturers rely on hedonic associations to distract
consumers from product risk.52 As an example, they point out the
tendency for cigarette manufacturers to use young, attractive mod-
els in their advertisements, arguably to foster good feelings about
cigarettes. 53
Although the extent of the problem that the new rhetoric pur-
ports to identify is unclear, it is almost certainly true that some
manufacturers try to manipulate consumer's assessments of risk
some of the time. Indeed, far from being a "provocative" thesis,54 it
seems almost obvious that manufacturers stand ready, willing and
able to exploit human frailty to make a buck. Market forces ensure
that if manufacturers can sell more of a product by manipulating
consumer preferences, they will do so.55
B. The Manipulation of Consumers as an Argument Against the
Fault-Based Liability Regime
The new proponents of EL contend that the manipulation of
consumers supports abandoning fault as the linchpin of liability in
products cases involving generically hazardous products.5" They
assert that if the courts were to take the research on risk percep-
tion from cognitive psychology seriously, they would hold manufac-
turers strictly liable for all of the harm that their products cause,
without regard to fault.5 7 We disagree, but restate their argu-
ments here.
1. The Traditional Justification of the Role of Fault in Products
Liability
Identifying the effect that the manipulation of consumers has
on manufacturer fault in products-liability law requires an under-
standing of why manufacturer fault plays such an important role
in these cases. The principal benefit of the central role that fault
plays in products cases is that it recruits both consumers and man-
ufacturers as co-guardians of safety. Fault-based liability imposes
52. See id. at 732-33.
53. See id. See also Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 19, at 1471-73, 1479-83
(describing the tobacco industry's advertising strategies).
54. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 19, at 1428.
55. See Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 19, at 729-30.
56. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 19, at 1425-27.
57. See id.
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liability on the parties-most often manufacturers or consumers-
who can most effectively avoid accidents.58 This effort comports
with both fairness and efficiency. The party that could have most
easily avoided the harm is intuitively the most responsible for that
harm. Psychological studies of how people allocate blame supports
this placement of liability.5 9 Also, forcing parties to bear the harm
that they could have avoided creates incentives for everyone to un-
dertake cost-effective precautions.6°
Close scrutiny of the circumstances that typically lead to the
harm products cause illuminates which party, manufacturer or
consumer, is in the best position to avoid harm. Two variables are
most relevant to determining when manufacturers should be lia-
ble: information about risk and consumer ability and motivations
to act on that information. 61 If consumers have perfect informa-
tion about the risks products pose and are both inclined and able to
act effectively on that information, then there is no reason to im-
pose liability on manufacturers. Manufacturers, however, almost
certainly know more about a product's risks than do consumers.
The traditional fault-based system holds a manufacturer liable for
failing to incorporate cost-effective safety precautions or for failing
to warn consumers of known risks that the product poses.62 Even
without considering the impact of advertisements designed to ma-
nipulate consumers, the tort system accounts for the disparity be-
58. See Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 541-43. Although many scholars
identify only two players-manufacturers and consumers-strictly speaking, there
are at least three. In addition to users and manufacturers, one must consider the
manager of the environment in which the consumer uses the product. The work-
place provides a good example of this trilogy because understanding workplace ac-
cidents necessitates consideration of the role played by workers, the workplace
machinery and the employers who are in charge of the environment of use. For a
treatment of the dynamics of workplace interaction, see Henderson & Twerski,
supra note 17, at 46-63.
59. There is an extensive psychological literature describing how people attri-
bute cause and fault. See Susan T. Fiske & Shelley E. Taylor, Social Cognition 22-
54 (1991). This literature shows that people attribute responsibility to the party
whose actions can be mentally undone most easily, which typically, although by no
means always, corresponds to the party who can most easily have avoided the acci-
dent. See Ziva Kunda, Social Cognition: Making Sense of People 143-58 (1999).
60. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
61. See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability
in Torts, 81 Yale L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972).
62. For a discussion on manufacturer liability resulting from failure to incor-
porate reasonable precautions, see Henderson & Twerski I, supra note 3, at 1329-
31; Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 2 cmts. b, i.
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tween manufacturer and consumer understanding of product-
related risks.
Manufacturers know more about a product, but consumer be-
havior also affects the likelihood that a product will cause injury.
Consumers can always defeat a properly designed product with
their own negligent misuse. They can also ensure that they safely
use a product that poses some inherent risks. Also, some consum-
ers might be aware that even though a product is safe for most
consumers, they should avoid it. Consumers would have no incen-
tive to undertake their own precautions if manufacturers were
forced to bear all of the cost of the harm that products cause.6 3
Manufacturers are obviously better positioned to determine the op-
timally safe design, but consumers are probably in the best posi-
tion to determine how to use the product safely or whether to use
the product at all.
The traditional fault-based system of products liability law
represents a careful balancing of responsibility between consumers
and manufacturers. It holds manufacturers responsible for those
things that they can best control-incorporating cost-effective
safety precautions and providing warnings-and holds consumers
liable for the rest. Courts have designed this allocation of liability
to ensure that consumers and manufacturers are partners in
reaching socially optimal levels of care. Except for generic risks
that are scientifically unknowable at the time of sale, the existing
system places liability on the manufacturer without regard to
fault.64
2. Manipulation of Consumers and the Role of Fault
The new proponents of EL argue that manufacturer manipula-
tion of consumers' risk assessments casts new light on this tradi-
63. See Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 540-43; Schwartz, supra note 23, at
356; Henderson & Twerski, supra note 17, at 271-301 (proclaiming that consumers
bear a permanent responsibility to avoid harm while using manufactured
products).
64. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. §1 cmt. a. In contrast, the
relatively few consumers who do discover manufacturer defects are in a better po-
sition to act on it because at that point, the consumer becomes the most efficient
cost minimizer. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 61, at 1060. Interestingly,
§ 402A cmt. n, to the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), allowed manufacturers
to use this consumer awareness as a defense to liability.
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tional analysis of products liability. 65 Manufacturers might use
marketing strategies that lead consumers to underestimate or ig-
nore the dangers a product poses, thereby inducing consumers to
purchase products that they might otherwise avoid, or to use prod-
ucts more dangerously than reason dictates. Manufacturers'
power to manipulate consumers' decisions about risk suggests that
manufacturers should bear greater responsibility for consumers'
decisions regarding whether to purchase a product and how to use
it.
Manufacturers' manipulation of consumers suggests a basic
flaw in the justification for retaining manufacturer fault as the
linchpin of liability in products cases. It suggests that manufactur-
ers are more responsible for consumer behavior than existing law
assumes. As one example of how this observation might affect the
analysis of the interplay between manufacturers and consumers,
consider the role that warnings play in products cases. As Profes-
sor Latin has noted, cognitive psychology suggests that manufac-
turers can remain immune from liability by placing warnings on
products while simultaneously undermining the effect of these
warnings.6 6 The inclusion of the warning arguably satisfies the
manufacturer's obligations under existing law even though the
consumer actually ignores the warning. In any subsequent lawsuit
filed by an injured consumer, the manufacturer can simply point to
the warning and say cynically, "See, I told you so."
More generally, to the extent that manufacturers can induce
consumers to underrate the risks a product poses, consumers will
believe the product is less costly than is the case.67 Whether the
manufacturer warns consumers about a particular risk, or whether
the courts consider the risk known and obvious, the manufacturer
might be able to sell more of a product by convincing consumers
that the product is not dangerous. Lured by the potential for in-
creased product sales, manufacturers might be induced to engage
in advertising strategies that lead to socially inefficient patterns of
product consumption.
Distracting consumers from the real risks products pose could
have two types of unwanted social consequences: it might under-
65. See Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 19, at 635-38; Hanson & Kysar II, supra
note 19, at 1424-25.
66. See Latin, supra note 19, at 1232-43.
67. See Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 19, at 729-30.
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mine consumers' efforts to take precautions against harm and it
might attract "high-risk" consumers to products that they should
avoid. As to the first effect, manufacturers might use advertising
to induce consumers to use products in ways that are inordinately
dangerous, as part of an effort to make the product seem safer and
more useful than is really the case.68 For example, automobile
manufacturers' emphasis on the crashworthiness of their products
could induce consumers to drive recklessly. As to the second effect,
manufacturers might run advertisements that tempt consumers-
who know themselves to be inefficiently high-risk users of a prod-
uct-with the product, as part of an effort to increase the number
of consumers interested in using a product.69 If these high-risk
consumers disregard the dangers a product poses, then these "inef-
ficient consumers" would be willing to use the product. For exam-
ple, cigarette manufacturers' efforts to associate cigarettes with
positive (particularly sexual) imagery might induce adolescents to
take up smoking, even though smoking at an early age is especially
harmful and makes it particularly difficult to quit smoking later in
life.
In effect, the new proponents of EL attempt to up-end the
traditional arguments that support the role of fault in products
cases. As stated above, the traditional arguments hold that con-
sumers must bear the risk of harm caused by safely designed prod-
ucts so that consumers will undertake precautions and will avoid
products if they are high-risk consumers. If manufacturers influ-
ence consumer behavior as much as the new proponents of EL
claim, however, then manufacturers are responsible both for prod-
uct design, ex ante, and for consumer behavior, ex post.
The arguments made by the new proponents of EL also side-
step long-standing debates concerning whether consumers natu-
rally underestimate or overestimate risk.70 Hanson and Kysar
contend that manufacturers will seek out and exploit advertising
techniques that cause consumers to underestimate the risks that
products pose. Even if some circumstances naturally lead consum-
ers to overestimate risk, manufacturers will work to minimize
these circumstances and implement advertising campaigns that
have the opposite effect. Thus, whatever peoples' natural proclivi-
68. See id. at 730.
69. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 19, at 1461-62.
70. See Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 19, at 723-24.
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ties-underestimation or overestimation of risk-the new propo-
nents of EL argue that manufacturers will find and exploit the
conditions that produce underestimation.
The new proponents of EL argue that EL provides the only
reliable cure for the adverse consequences of the manipulation of
consumers. 71 They complain that manufacturers generally escape
liability for their marketing campaigns and thus face inadequate
incentives to account for the social harm that their products
cause. 72 As a result, they contend, traditional fault-based liability
allows, and competition requires, manufacturers to engage in ad-
vertising campaigns that lull consumers into a false sense of secur-
ity, thereby increasing sale and consumption of their products. 73
Because EL would impose all product-related harm on manufac-
turers, it would force manufacturers to worry about both consum-
ers' behavior after purchase and whether high-risk consumers
should be purchasing the product in the first instance. EL's new
advocates argue that the system would give manufacturers incen-
tives to try to inspire consumers to use the products in reasonable
ways after purchase and incentives to try to avoid selling their
products to high-risk consumers. 74
III. PRACTICAL OBJECTIONS TO THE NEW RHETORIC
The new proponents of EL have left several intellectual gaps
in their argument, both practical and theoretical. In this section
we identify practical points they have failed to seriously address:
first, they have not even attempted to quantify the social problem
they purport to identify; second, they have failed to consider the
possibility that their observations about advertising are well-
known to courts and regulators, who have already adopted sensible
reforms to address these effects; third, their argument does no
more than add rhetorical support for EL while doing nothing to
address the fatal flaws that would plague an EL system.
71. See id. at 747-49; Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 19, at 1555-58.
72. See Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 19, at 747-48.
73. See id. at 730.
74. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 19, at 1555-58.
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A. EL's New Proponents Provide no Estimate of the Extent of
the Problem Allegedly Posed by the Manipulation of
Consumers
EL's new proponents do not clearly identify the extent of the
problem that manufacturers' attempts to manipulate consumers
allegedly create. Hanson and Kysar, in a pair of articles, provide
the most extensive documentation of the potential problem. These
papers, however, provide only anecdotal examples to illustrate the
existence of manufacturer manipulation of consumers.75 The ex-
amples Hanson and Kysar identify in support of their claims actu-
ally suggest only that manufacturers attempt to manipulate
consumers; they reveal little or no evidence of the success of these
efforts. There are several good reasons to suppose that manipulat-
ing consumer risk perceptions is extremely difficult, despite the in-
fluence cognitive biases have on these estimates. First, many
cognitive processes operate against consumption-the status quo
generally runs against purchasing a new product. Second, manu-
facturers must also compete against manufacturers of other prod-
ucts for consumers' limited budgets. Finally, for manufacturers to
manipulate consumers successfully, they must command consum-
ers' attention; advertising may be ubiquitous, but it is also easily
ignored by media-savvy consumers who have learned how to disre-
gard advertising.76
EL's new advocates could argue that the widespread consump-
tion of dangerous products such as cigarettes, alcohol, firearms
and motor vehicles provides ample evidence of the success of these
marketing campaigns. 77 Such an argument, however, would be
misplaced. These products all confer some benefits upon the
users.78 Even without manipulative advertising, many consumers
would surely purchase them. More importantly, the new propo-
75. The authors admit as much. See Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 19, at 748
("These examples ... are, of course, only anecdotal").
76. See Carla V. Lloyd, Advertising Media: A Changing Marketplace, in The
Advertising Business: Operations, Creativity, Media Planning, Integrated Com-
munications 89, 89-93 (John Philips Jones ed., 1999).
77. They do so with cigarettes. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 19, at
1471.
78. Even cigarettes, despite their many costs, confer some benefits on their
users. See generally W. Kip Viscusi, Smoking: Making the Risky Decision 5-15
(1992) (discussing, the factors contributing to people's perceptions of risk in regard
to smoking).
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nents of EL do not demonstrate that these products enjoy success
because the manufacturers used advertising to hide the risks prod-
ucts pose, as opposed to any other marketing technique. Advertis-
ing has many goals other than manipulating consumer preferences
or beliefs about the risks that products pose.
Hanson and Kysar's own review of examples of market manip-
ulation is telling on this point. In addition to their detailed ac-
count of cigarette advertising, we identify thirty-eight specific
examples of advertisements they claim are designed to manipulate
consumers. Of these, even by a generous count, only seven have
anything to do with hiding the risks products pose. 79 The other
thirty-one are simply efforts to sell more of a product through the
use of such tactics as rebates, clever pricing or ambience at point-
of-sale.80 In fact, of these thirty-one, seventeen do not even rely on
79. They identify the following: (1) safety caps and medications are arguably
designed to lull consumers rather than protect them, see Hanson & Kysar I, supra
note 19, at 725; (2) Sport-utility-vehicle commercial suggesting it lends the ability
to control uncontrollable risks, see id. at 730; (3) alcohol advertising showing only
people having good times, see id. at 731; (4) safe-looking packaging as a way of
anchoring consumers on the idea that the product is safe, see id. at 731-32 (they
identify a fairly tenuous relationship between this advertisement and the psycho-
logical phenomenon of anchoring); (5) identifying a product in percent fat-free
rather than percent fat as taking advantage of framing effects, see Hanson &
Kysar II, supra note 19, at 1451. We count the following two as close to the idea
that manufacturers are seeking to distract consumers from dangers products pose,
but are arguably just efforts to make the product seem tasty and appealing: (6)
using small packaging for unhealthy products as a way of letting consumers feel
that they are retaining some control over their consumption of the product, see
Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 19, at 735; (7) Hiagen Dazs' use of an umlaut in the
word "Extraas" for its new high-fat ice cream, see Hanson & Kysar II, supra note
19, at 1435 (it is not clear what the point of the umlaut or the misspelling is, but it
may be to make the unhealthfully high fat content seem appealing; we suggest
that these gimmicks are merely efforts to remain consistent with the company's
overall, pseudo-Teutonic product branding).
80. These include seventeen generic efforts to sell more products unrelated to
risk: (1) money-back offers as a way of creating an attachment to the product, see
Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 19, at 734; (2) visceral associations with products,
such as delicious-looking close up photographs, see id. at 738; (3) late-night televi-
sion offers for groups of products, announcing, "but wait, there's more," see id. at
740; (4) banks' use of a minimum balance for no fee checking even though cost of
checking is less than opportunity cost of the money in the account, see id. at 742;
(5) Contact cold medication capitalizing on consumers' fear of losing their job be-
cause they must take time off due to illness, see Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 19,
at 1463; (6) sugarless gum (rather than sugared gum) put at child-level near
check-out, which attracts kids just as much and assuages parents angered by the
market's insidious efforts to sell gum to their kids, see id. at 1437; (7) contrast
effects and car choices, see id. at 1440; (8) artificially high sticker price to take
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advantage of anchoring effects (possibly framing as well), see id.; (9) discounts for
cash payments rather surcharges for credit, see id. at 1441; (10) prices ending in
the nines, see id. at 144142; (11) "invisible" $0.009 at gas stations, see Hanson &
Kysar II, supra note 19, at 1442; (12) home sales and not-so-round prices, see id. at
1442-43; (13) ambience effects in supermarkets and other retail (such as use of
Muzak, product placement, store lighting, fake aromas, etc), see id. at 1445-46; (14)
low pricing of staples, such as milk and eggs, in supermarkets to attract consumers
and convince them it is a bargain store, see id. at 1449; (15) raise prices by "just
noticeable difference" to consumers, see id.; (16) discount specials in supermarkets
as attractions to the store, see id. at 1449-50; (17) Nestle's campaign to sell baby
formula in less-developed countries by advertising indicating that it was best for
children, see Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 19, at 1464 (we do not count this as
distracting from product risk as the product risk was that of misuse-heavy dilution
of the product).
They also identify fourteen instances of outright deceptive advertising that
have nothing to do with psychology: (1) Uno's "low-fat" pizza that was actually
high in fat, see id. at 1452; (2) Mazola's claim that eating chicken fried in Mazola
reduced serum cholesterol, see id.; (3) Campbell's claim that their "soup is good
food", even though it is high in sodium, see id.; (4) Chewing Wrigley's gum amelio-
rates indigestion, see id. at 1453; (5) Gerber's claim that four out of five pediatri-
cians prefer Gerber baby food, which excludes physicians that do not recommend
baby food, see id.; (6) host of unsubstantiated claims concerning the health benefits
of vitamins sold by General Nutrition, Inc., see Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 19,
at 1453; (7) Quaker oat bran's unsubstantiated claim that it reduces the risk of
heart attacks, see id. at 1452; (8) McDonald's claim that their french fry packaging
was recyclable, even though it was not, see id. at 1460; (9) Mr. Coffee's claim that it
had stopped using chlorine when it switched to a chlorine-based compound, see id.
at 1460; (10) Orkin's false claims about the lack of toxicity of an insecticide, see id.;
(11) Proctor and Gamble's claim that a diaper was recyclable, even though it would
be nearly impossible to recycle, see id. at 1460; (12) Saab's unfounded claim that its
catalytic converter reduced "ozone-punching hydrocarbons," see Hanson & Kysar
II, supra note 19, at 1460; (13) gasoline manufacturer's continued selling of use-
less, but expensive, high-octane fuel, see id. at 1444-45; (14) unjustifiable safety
claims by Volvo, see id. at 1466. We also did not count several examples as either
instances of distraction from risk or of psychological efforts to sell products unre-
lated to risk. These include the numerous efforts pharmaceutical companies make
to induce physicians to prescribe their products, see id. at 1457-59, as this seems
like outright bribery, or at least has a more complicated agency problem associate
with it. Also their general claim that fast cars, rollerblades, and extreme sports
are marketed to the 25% of the population that consists of "thrillseekers" lacked
substantiation, see id. at 1461. We likewise did not count the NRA's efforts to sell
guns to women by showing scary scenes of women alone in dark alleys, see id. at
1463-64, because the NRA is not a manufacturer and does not sell guns; this was
doubtless an effort to attract members. We did not count the reference to Professor
Christopher Hsee's work on comparability, see Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 19, at
735, as their use of it was unclear and not tied to a specific advertisement strategy
that we could recognize. Finally we did not count their assertion that manufactur-
ers try to seem cooperative and fair because consumers prefer to buy from people
that are cooperative and fair, see id. at 737, 741, as it seemed trivial and no specific
examples were provided other than an assertion that this keeps manufacturers
from price-gauging. As noted in the text, advertising campaigns by cigarette man-
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psychological principles-they are simply examples of false adver-
tising. It is unclear from the string of examples how much of the
$350 billion advertisers spend each year is spent on manipulating
perceptions of risk. Although they "invite the reader to draw from
her own experience as a consumer"81 to supplement these exam-
ples, we suspect that most readers who do so will also identify ex-
amples of deception or manipulation unrelated to product risk and
even unrelated to psychological principles.
Despite their efforts, EL's new proponents have not identified
many examples of advertisements that actually use psychological
principles to successfully deceive consumers about product risk.
Hanson and Kysar claim that they were also initially skeptical of
the power of manufacturers to manipulate consumer risk prefer-
ences, but began to be swayed upon learning "that the manufac-
turer of Campbell's Soup knows, as an empirical fact, that placing
soup cans out of alphabetical order on store shelves will increase
sales by exactly six percent."8 2 While fascinating, we cannot
fathom how observations like this support radical reform of the
products-liability system. If courts are to adopt the kind of drastic
change in the legal system that EL represents, they need better
evidence that the problems resulting from manipulation of con-
sumers are more than anecdote and conjecture.
B. Existing Products Liability Law is More Sensitive to the
Manipulation of Consumer Biases than the Proponents
of EL Recognize
The new proponents of EL contend that EL is the only way to
remedy the manufacturer manipulation of consumers.8 3 They
complain that existing tort law relies too heavily on the efficacy of
product warnings; they assert that when legally adequate warn-
ings are given, manufacturers are effectively immune from liability
for harm caused by generic product risks and are free to manipu-
late biases for their own benefit. Because these manipulations
cannot be monitored by "command and control" regulation (manu-
facturers can be kept "honest" in regard to their marketing tactics),
ufacturers largely support their thesis, and, in fact, probably provide the best sup-
port for it. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 19, at 1467-1553.
81. Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 19, at 638.
82. Id. at 748.
83. See id. at 723-24; Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 19, at 1555-58.
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only by internalizing all costs of injury associated with product use
and consumption. These contentions understate the existing legal
responses manufacturers' attempts to manipulate consumers.
Both tort law and consumer protection statutes already respond to
manufacturer attempts to manipulate consumers.
1. Courts Have Recognized Manufacturers' Efforts to
Manipulate Consumers and Have Adjusted Tort
Doctrines to Respond to It
Existing tort remedies are more sensitive to manufacturers'
attempts to manipulate consumers than the new proponents of EL
suggest. For example, in the product area upon which proponents
of EL focus most of their attention-cigarette-related injuries-the
bases of manufacturers' liability have been extended far beyond
failure-to-warn. (Indeed, traditional state law failure-to-warn
claims are now largely preempted by federal regulations.8 4) A pan-
oply of other theories based on the marketing of cigarettes is avail-
able to products liability plaintiffs, some of which clearly reflect
growing judicial concern with manufacturers' manipulation of con-
sumers' cognitive biases.8 5 The recent global settlements of ac-
tions by state Attorneys General contain explicit commitments on
the part of cigarette manufacturers to curtail efforts to manipulate
consumers via advertising, especially efforts to entice young per-
sons to begin smoking.8 6
Existing law reflects the fact that courts are well aware of
manufacturers' efforts to negate the beneficial effects of otherwise
reasonable product designs and warnings. The recently promul-
gated Restatement of Products Liability explicitly recognizes that,
in connection with a manufacturer's obligation to provide adequate
designs and warnings, public appreciation of product-related risks
should not be undermined by advertisements that encourage risky
84. See Henderson and Twerski, supra note 17, at 395-96 (citing Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992), as the leading example of federal regula-
tory preemption).
85. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (providing exam-
ples of the theories of express warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation and con-
spiracy to defraud.).
86. See Master Tobacco Settlement Agreement, available at http://
www.cnie.orglnle/ag-55.htmI (last visited Dec. 18, 2000).
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consumer behavior.8 7 Thus, the new Restatement speaks directly
to the potential of advertising to manipulate consumer perceptions
and behavior and admonishes courts to be alert to these possibili-
ties in assessing the adequacy of product designs and warnings:
[Clonsumer expectations about product performance and the
dangers attendant to product use affect how risks are per-
ceived and relate to foreseeability and frequency of the risks
of harm, both of which are relevant under [this Restatement.]
Such expectations are often influenced by how products are
portrayed and marketed and can have a significant impact on
consumer behavior.88
Moreover, the new Restatement incorporates a significant
change from an earlier, contrary position in the Restatement, Sec-
ond, of Torts. Earlier, courts tended to weigh product warnings
heavily, not reaching the question of adequate product design
when warnings appeared adequate.8 9 The new Restatement recog-
nizes that the design question should come first, precisely because
warnings are capable of being undermined by subtle but effective
advertising. The Restatement makes clear that, with regard to ge-
neric risks posed by durable products, a manufacturer's primary
duty is to adopt reasonable product designs rather to warn against
the risks.90 An important factor in determining reasonableness in
this regard is "the nature and strength of consumer expectations
regarding the product, including expectations arising from product
portrayal and marketing."91
Judicial decisions reflect this sensitivity to the power of manu-
facturers to manipulate consumers' cognitive biases via advertis-
ing. For example, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed a plaintiffs'
judgment based on the defective design of an all-terrain vehicle,
citing the manufacturer's marketing efforts.92 The plaintiffs were
injured when they drove such a vehicle off the top of a ridge, flew
87. See generally Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 2 cmts. a-g (sup-
porting the position that even though consumer expectations cannot stand alone as
evidence of product defectiveness, courts must consider the influence of advertis-
ing when determining how consumers perceive risk and thus, determine the fore-
seeability of harm).
88. Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2 cmt. g.
89. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. j.
90. See Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2 cmt. 1.
91. Id. at § 2 cmt. f
92. See Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568, 579 (Ohio
1981).
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almost fifty feet through the air and landed upside down near the
bottom of a slope twenty-five feet below. The plaintiffs argued at
trial that the defendant-manufacturer's advertising induced such
dangerous user behavior, and that the roll bars should therefore
have been designed to withstand the great forces put upon them.
The court concluded:
Cited as exemplary of this "intentional incitement of unlaw-
ful conduct" was the sound track employed in the Jeep televi-
sion commercials: "My Jeep CJ is the toughest rig around";
"That's Jeep guts-Guts to take you where you have never
been before"; "CJ-5-will give the young couples the ride of
their lives on the dunes and gutsy ground steering"; "All
right, which one of you guys is going to climb that big old hill
with me? I mean you guys aren't yellow, are you? Is it a
steep hill? Yeah, little lady, you could say it's a steep hill.
Let's try it. The King of the Hill is about to discover the new
Jeep CJ-7"; "That Jeep four-wheel drive is tough enough to go
anywhere."... The television commercials relied upon by the
[court below] demonstrated an off-the-road use. The commer-
cials are relevant to the foreseeable use of the vehicle and the
unreasonable danger of the product when used as intended.93
Courts have followed this same path in cases involving con-
sumables such as prescription drugs.94 Furthermore, leading prod-
ucts liability texts and law review articles recognize these
considerations and argue that courts should be sensitive to them.95
2. Command-and-Control Regulation of Marketing
Consumer 'protection regulations at the state and federal
levels also constrain manufacturers' abilities to manipulate con-
sumers. Federal law forbids manufacturers from making claims
that are "unfair or deceptive,"96 which is defined to include any
marketing practices that "cause[ I or [are] likely to cause substan-
tial injury to consumers."97 Although vague, these prohibitions
93. Id. at 579.
94. See Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 662 (Cal. 1973).
95. See generally Henderson & Twerski, supra note 17, at 469-72 (including a
postscript on other forms of defective marketing); Richard W. Wright, The Effi-
ciency Theory of Causation and Responsibility: Unscientific Formalism and False
Semantics, 63 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 553 (1987) (clarifying the relationship between
causation and responsibility in tort law).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1995).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (1995).
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give the Federal Trade Commission broad authority to police man-
ufacturers' marketing practices for activities that will mislead con-
sumers in harmful ways. Indeed, many of the examples of
manufacturer manipulation of consumers that Hanson and Kysar
identify have been targets of enforcement actions by the Federal
Trade Commission. 98 Manufacturers' efforts to manipulate con-
sumers have not escaped the notice of the lawmakers and
regulators.
The proponents of EL appear to believe that these regulatory
efforts to develop command-and-control regulation of advertising
are doomed from the outset.99 They contend that regulators only
inadequately identify instances in which manufacturers commit
outright fraud and it would be impossible for regulators to identify
manufacturers subtle, but effective, manipulation of consumers'
beliefs. 100 They assert that manufacturers are not fully aware of
how their marketing practices actually work to sell their prod-
ucts,101 and hence, regulators could not possibly identify all forms
of deception.
We concede that with a $350 billion annual marketing budget,
manufacturers and retailers will almost certainly outpace regula-
tory efforts to develop, ex ante, an effective set of command-and-
control restrictions on advertising. Nevertheless, the breadth of
the statutory authority held by the Federal Trade Commission al-
lows it to conduct ex post assessments of marketing practices that
deceive and harm consumers. A manufacturer might be able to
use focus groups and other marketing research techniques to cir-
cumvent any command-and-control regime, but they risk subse-
quent enforcement authority when consumers begin to feel the
consequences of these practices. Consumers who are duped into
buying risky or unwanted products can and do complain to the
Federal Trade Commission. The Commission has made it easier to
lodge complaints as consumers can now even file them on-line. 10 2
Thus, marketing campaigns are evaluated ex post for their decep-
98. Hanson & Kysar 11, supra note 19, at 1452-60.
99. See id. at 1556.
100. See id.
101. See Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 19, at 743-44.
102. See Federal Trade Commission Consumer Complaint Form, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/ftclcomplaint.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2000).
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tive content, so that even if ex ante regulation is inadequate, man-
ufacturers might still be deterred from deceptive practices.
C. The Unworkability of EL
The new rhetoric supporting EL also makes no effort to ad-
dress the many problems that beset systems of strict liability. Al-
though referred to as a liability system by its proponents, EL
would function, at its core, as an insurance scheme. It would re-
quire manufacturers to compensate those injured by products for
any harm that befalls them. This would presumably induce manu-
facturers to invest in accident-loss avoidance up to, but not beyond,
the point where it is cheaper to insure against liability for residual
accident losses. The combined costs of loss avoidance measures
and insurance against residual losses would presumably be re-
flected in the market prices of the manufacturers' products. Thus,
EL more closely resembles an insurance/compensation system,
such as worker compensation, than it resembles a liability system.
On its face, substituting an insurance regime for a liability re-
gime is not troublesome. According to the new proponents of EL,
such an adjustment would ensure that the prices manufacturers
charge consumers would include the cost of residual accident
losses, thereby undercutting manufacturers' incentives to deceive
consumers about safety. Such a conclusion, however, ignores basic
mechanics of any insurance scheme and fails to address fundamen-
tal questions about when a product "causes" a particular harm.
1. EL as an Insurance Scheme
Insurance involves the transfer of risks of loss from insureds
to insurers and the pooling of those risks by the latter to predict
the projected aggregate losses incurred by the former.10 3 Insureds
pay predetermined premiums into the risk pools and insurers pay
out of the pools for covered losses when they occur. For any insur-
ance system to remain viable, several conditions must be satisfied:
the risks insured against must be ascertainable ex-ante, at the
time of risk-pool formation' 0 4 and the covered losses must be as-
certainable ex-post, at the time claims are made against the
103. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Insurance Law And Regulation 2 (2000).
104. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Distributing Risk 46-47 (1986).
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pool.' 0 5 Moreover, insureds must be charged premiums that more
or less accurately reflect their individual contributions to the risk
pools which they are aggregated. 1° 6 Individual insureds will even-
tually experience actual losses that are not necessarily propor-
tional to the premiums such insureds paid earlier. But the
premiums charged at the time of original contracting must reflect
the risks that each insured presents at that time and each insured
must be constrained by the terms of coverage from significantly
increasing the risk thereafter.
This process of "risk classification," whereby premiums are
made proportional to insureds' contributions to risk pools combats
two major threats to the viability of insurance pools: adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard. 10 7 Adverse selection reflects the tendency
of insureds who present disproportionately higher risks of loss to
enter and remain in risk pools when they are charged premiums
that do not adequately reflect the projected losses generated by
those higher risks-when they are undercharged relative to other,
lower-risk insureds. When this occurs, lower-risk insureds (who
are presumably aware that they are being concomitantly
overcharged) will exit the risk pools, resulting in the need for a
general increase in premiums charged to those remaining. If
higher-risk insureds continue to be undercharged, relatively lower-
risk insureds, measured at any given point in time, will continue to
exit the risk pool, requiring further premium increases, and so on.
This "unraveling" process will, if left unchecked, eventually de-
stroy the integrity of any insurance system.108
The same negative effects occur when insureds are allowed,
without jeopardy under the relevant terms of coverage, to increase
their risks of covered losses by actions engaged in after entering
insurance contracts. This is known as a "moral hazard."10 9 Those
insureds who are able to take such actions will wind up paying less
than they should for coverage, leading over time to premium in-
creases that drive lower-risk insureds out of the relevant insurance
pools. Moral hazards arise after the creation of the insurance con-
105. See id. at 4.
106. See id. at 2.
107. See id. at 3-5.
108. See id. See also George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Mod-
ern Tort Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1521 (1987) (discussing an application to the operation
of tort liability).
109. See Abraham, supra note 104, at 4.
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tract. In contrast, adverse selection occurs before the fact of con-
tracting for insurance. Any system of insurance must adequately
minimize both adverse selection and moral hazard if it is to remain
viable.
A combination of adverse selection and moral hazard would
overwhelm any EL plan of the sort envisioned by its proponents,
especially with regard to durable products. Assuming that alloca-
tions of the underlying premium charged to purchasers at the time
of sale for insurance against product-related losses would not dif-
ferentiate among purchasers, and that additional insurance
charges could not be imposed on purchasers or users post-sale,
those engaging in relatively high levels of risky product usage
would be attracted to the no-fault insurance program because they
would be undercharged relative to low-risk users. Adverse-selec-
tion effects would be exacerbated by moral hazard in the form of
post-sale adjustments in product usage that would increase the ag-
gregate product-related accident losses.
In contrast, those engaging in relatively lower levels of low-
risk product usage, would be overcharged by EL, and would, to the
extent possible, avoid participating in the insurance program. Sev-
eral major avenues of escape for low-risk consumers would be
available. In connection with privately owned and operated motor
vehicles, for example, various forms of public transportation would
become more attractive. The useful lives of all motor vehicles
would be extended significantly through elaborate programs of re-
pair and rebuilding, thereby reducing the per-usage costs of the
time-of-sale-only EL insurance charge. (Interestingly, owners of
used vehicles already in use at the inception of the EL regime, who
would escape the time-of-sale insurance charge on subsequent
sales of new vehicles, would enjoy a windfall as the value of their
vehicles rose in used-vehicle after-markets.) As EL premiums on
new-vehicle sales rose over time to reflect the upward trend of loss
experience, the EL insurance pools for new vehicle sales would un-
ravel to the point that they would eventually reflect only the costli-
est patterns of vehicle usage. To be sure, equilibria would sooner
or later be reached, short of across-the-board collapse, because con-
sumers in general would be forced to continue to buy and consume
new durable products at some levels, quite apart from insurance
costs. Where such equilibria would be reached cannot be
fathomed. But one conclusion appears unavoidable: adoption of EL
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for multi-variable, "synergistic" product risks presented by durable
products would lead to profound and unintended social conse-
quences that would almost certainly fail to achieve the intended
objective of increased product safety.
2. EL Creates Novel Causation Issues
EL also creates novel administrative problems regarding
whether a product can be said to be the legal cause of a particular
injury. A concrete example makes this point most clearly. Assume
the following sequence of events: a victim-to-be is driving an auto-
mobile while intoxicated, swerves to avoid a skate-boarder inter-
fering with traffic, loses control of the automobile, breaks through
a traffic barrier and collides violently with a tractor-trailer parked
by the roadside. Against which EL insurance pool would a claim
for the victim's injuries appropriately be brought? The automo-
bile's EL insurance pool? The alcoholic beverage's? The skate
board's? The traffic barrier's? The tractor trailer's? Some of the
above? All of the above? If several, or all, of the relevant insurance
pools were implicated, on what conceptual basis would responsibil-
ity be apportioned?
Existing products liability law provides consistent answers to
these questions of proximate causation based on a combination of
traditional legal concepts which include product defect, individual
fault and proximate causation. 110 A system of EL, having aban-
doned all of these legal constructs as the outmoded and inadequate
trappings of "command and control" regulation, would flounder
hopelessly.
110. See Henderson & Twerski I, supra note 3, at 1286. In a critique of EL, one
of the authors observed:
[Tihe product liability system relies on the defect concept for cohesion.
The defect requirement is more than merely a convenient stopping place
on a smooth continuum running from "less" to "more" liability. The defect
concept, in helping to define the compensable event, frames the nature of
the plaintiffs underlying entitlement. Even seemingly neutral, factual is-
sues of causation become incoherent unless they remain anchored to some
adequately articulable basis on which the plaintiffs rights rest. Thus,
any across-the-board attempt to abandon the requirement of defective-
ness would place courts and the products liability system in total chaos.
Id. Indeed, elsewhere in the article, the author refers to defect as the "conceptual
linchpin" that holds products liability law together. See id. at 1267.
2000]
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3. An Exception Where Strict Liability Is Less Troublesome
For some types of products, a strict liability insurance regime
such as EL can be more workable. Some product-related risks con-
front the consumer with a "take it or leave it" choice to either use
or consume the product, thereby exposing herself to the risk of in-
jury or avoiding the risk altogether. Once use or consumption oc-
curs, the risk of harm cannot cost-effectively be reduced by the
consumer's conduct. These harms are akin to spinning a kind of
negative "roulette wheel"; the product leaves most consumers un-
harmed, but visits great harm upon some unfortunate individual,
through no fault of their own. Each consumer, in the words of a
carnival pitchman, "pays her money and takes her chances."
The clearest example of a product-related risk that fits this
description is the risk that a new product contains a manufactur-
ing defect that, during use or consumption, causes injury. The
chances of any new product unit containing such a defect are fixed
and quite ascertainable at the time of sale. The chances that the
defect will cause injury are also fixed and ascertainable at the time
of sale and cannot be cost-effectively reduced by the user's or con-
sumer's post-sale conduct. Other examples include the risk that a
manufacturing defect will cause the steering of a new motor vehi-
cle suddenly to fail, or a wood lathe suddenly and forcefully to re-
lease a spinning piece of wood, causing personal injury.111
Products liability has, for decades, recognized the underlying na-
ture of manufacturing defects and imposes liability on the manu-
facturer for all such defects, regardless of the manufacturer's fault.
Some products also present an inherent risk of injury, shared
by all other units of similar design, that causes harm to randomly
selected users or consumers irrespective of the manner in which
the product is used or consumed. Most of these cases involve con-
sumables that cause negative side effects in a relatively small per-
centage of consumers whose identities cannot be ascertained
111. For more on these classic products liability cases, see generally Greenman
v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (holding that a plaintiff who
brought suit for injuries sustained while using a wood lathe, was allowed to re-
cover for his injury by the defective product without proving that the manufacturer
was negligent in providing adequate quality control in making the product); Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) (eliminating privity as
a requirement for suit by holding that a plaintiff injured while driving a car pur-
chased by her husband, could recover for crash related injuries caused by the steer-
ing system's failure).
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before the fact of accidental injury. Assuming that a consumer has
knowledge of the relevant risks, the only meaningful choice is
whether or not to consume the product and thereby take the
chance of injury. Examples include the risk that smoking ciga-
rettes may cause life-threatening diseases or that ingesting pre-
scription drugs may cause harmful side effects.
These "roulette-style" injuries are more amenable to a strict
liability insurance scheme than those product-related injuries
caused by the interplay of the consumer and the manufacturer.
The relevant risks presented by such products are known at the
time of sale and problems of causation, at the time of accidental
injury, are relatively manageable. Moreover, adverse selection is
contained by the fact that both the risk of defect and the projected
severity of physical injury in connection with new product use or
consumption are essentially identical for all users and consumers.
Thus, supporting the payment by each purchaser of the same pro-
rata portion of the underlying insurance premium at time of sale.
Individual purchasers present different monetary values regarding
the interests placed at risk. In theory, this necessitates a variable
premium-allocation structure in order to avoid adverse selection in
the form of over-purchase of relatively risky products by relatively
productive, higher-income consumers and under-purchase by rela-
tively less productive, lower-income consumers. In any event, once
new products are purchased and used or consumed, users and con-
sumers have no significant control over the risks posed by manu-
facturing defects. This significantly reduces, if not eliminates, the
threat of moral hazard.
4. Summary on the Workability of EL
The point here is not that the existing products liability sys-
tem responds perfectly to any adverse consequences of manufac-
turer marketing campaigns. We concede that economic forces
induce manufacturers to undertake marketing campaigns that
which have adverse social consequences that escape remedy under
the existing legal regime. Our point, however, is that the existing
liability system does a much better job in this regard than EL pro-
ponents give it credit for, and that it is becoming more sensitive
over time. Moreover, even if command-and-control regulations do
not achieve all that EL does in theory, at least the existing prod-
ucts liability system is reasonably effective on its own terms. In
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contrast, whatever attractiveness EL may have as a purely theo-
retical construct, the absolute manufacturers' liability that it calls
for could never be made to function as a practical matter.112 Thus,
even if, in abstract theory, a system of EL for generic product risks
would be superior to existing command-and-control regulation,
that is all that EL is-abstract theory that could never be made to
function except in narrow sub-areas such as manufacturing de-
fects, where it would add nothing new.
IV. MARKETPLACE MANIPULATIONS BY MANUFACTURERS CAN
RAISE, As WELL As LOWER, CONSUMER
PERCEPTIONS OF RISK
Even holding aside practical objections, the new proponents of
EL try to make the case that cognitive psychology supports their
position. EL's new proponents focus their attention exclusively on
market forces that induce manufacturers to understate product-re-
lated risks, thereby ignoring the possibility that manufacturers
frequently have incentives to overstate the risks products pose. 113
As they observe, the psychological research on risk perception sup-
ports the conclusion that consumers both under react and over-
react to risk.114 This allows manufacturers the opportunity to
manipulate consumers by either over-selling a product or over-sell-
ing safety precautions, whichever better suits their market niche.
Superficially, manufacturers might appear to have no incentives to
overstate risk, but in fact, they have reasons to do so. Further-
more, as shown below, adopting a system of EL would substan-
tially amplify incentives for manufacturers to overstate risk and
over-sell safety precautions.
A. Incentives for Manufacturers to Raise Consumer Perceptions
of Risk
Would manufacturers ever knowingly overstate the risks
posed by products? At first glance, the answer appears to be "obvi-
ously not." Overstating the risks associated with products makes
112. See Henderson & Twerski I, supra note 3, at 1279-86.
113. See Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 19, at 726. ("Even if the overwhelming
majority of cognitive biases points toward overestimation of product risks, manu-
facturers will selectively target only those biases that lead to underestimation of
risks.")
114. See id. at 722-23.
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products seem more expensive than they really are, reducing de-
mand.115 Nevertheless, the media are filled with advertisements
that remind consumers of risks posed by some product-related ac-
tivities. Consider several examples of television advertisements: a
tire manufacturer repeatedly depicts a baby riding across winding
country roads in one of its tires and reminds viewers that "you
have a lot riding on your tires;" a car manufacturer shows personal
testimonials of people who survived accidents in their cars; numer-
ous cereal and vitamin makers remind viewers of the risks of con-
tracting cancer; and one medical-equipment manufacturer tells the
tale of a man who survives a horrific accident because the hospital
he was taken to has one of its devices (the voice-over in this ad
says: "Believe it or not, this is your lucky day"). Advertisements
such as these play to all of the cognitive limitations that lead peo-
ple to overestimate the risk that product-related activities pose
and use emotional appeals to induce people to fear many such
activities. 116
The unifying theme of these advertisements is fairly apparent
from the list of products in the last paragraph-these advertisers
all sell precautions against otherwise unavoidable product-related
hazards. In some instances, the advertised products constitute
stand-alone precautions against the unavoidable risks that life, in-
cluding the consumption of products generally, poses; the cereals
reduce cancer risks and the medical devices help doctors save lives
put at risk by accidents. In others, sellers of basic products empha-
size the relative safety of their versions (or brands) the safety fea-
tures are designed into the basic products themselves; certain
types of tires or automobiles reduce the probability of accidents or
the risks associated with them. Especially with respect to products
that have become necessities in contemporary society-for which
demand is substantially inelastic-selling relatively safer versions
of basic products might be attractive to some manufacturers.
Even when demand for a product is relatively elastic, manu-
facturers who invest relatively more in safety precautions (as op-
posed to other, non-safety-related aspects of a product) will find
115. See id. at 724. ("Other things being equal, it is in the manufacturer's in-
terest for consumers to have the lowest estimate of product risks possible: The
lower the consumer's risk estimate, the more consumers will be willing to pay for
the product, leading to greater sales and increased profits for manufacturers.")
116. We also invite readers to review their own experience as consumers.
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advantage in heightening consumer fears and anxieties. A suc-
cessful scare campaign will frighten many consumers in the mar-
ket, thereby increasing demand for safety. Even though this tactic
presumably reduces overall demand for the basic product, it will
differentially and offsettingly benefit the manufacturer who has
developed a relative advantage in offering safety precautions. In
this respect, manufacturers are trapped in a prisoner's dilemma;
even if they might collectively maximize their profits by manipu-
lating consumers' fear of product-related risks, they are unable to
coordinate their activities without running afoul of antitrust laws
or encountering self-serving defections that threaten any cartel.
Consequently, some manufacturers will maximize their market
share by heightening consumer fears notwithstanding the fact that
demand for the basic, underlying products is thereby reduced. 117
Even advertisements that seem, at least superficially, de-
signed to assuage consumer fears might actually be targeted at
heightening them. Cigarette makers, for example, have histori-
cally created safety-oriented products such as filtered and low-tar
cigarettes; more recently, some companies have run advertise-
ments portraying their products as containing only natural ingre-
dients." s To be effective, these campaigns must produce some
marginal increase in the level of anxiety about the underlying
product-anxiety that can be mollified by use of "safer" versions of
the product. Hanson and Kysar have argued that such advertise-
ments are designed purely to soothe existing consumer fears,
thereby increasing sales of the product overall.119 Such cam-
paigns, however, are probably not designed so much-or at all-to
increase the number of smokers as they are designed to increase
the number of people using a particular brand of cigarettes.
Whether this increase occurs because more people smoke (perhaps
now believing that they have a "natural," and perhaps safer ver-
sion of a tobacco product), or whether it occurs because more smok-
117. When the precursor to the Consumer Product Safety Commission-The Na-
tional Commission on Product Safety-conducted hearings (1968-1970) leading to
the establishment of the federal agency, entrepreneurs testified regarding the dan-
gers of products to convince the Commission that their safety devices needed to be
required by law. See James A. Henderson Jr., Book Note, 51 B.U. L. Rev. 704, 715-
17 (1971) (reviewing Consumer Protection or Consumer Repression? A Critique of
the National Commission on Product Safety).
118. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 19, at 1473-79.
119. See id. at 1462-66, 1473-79.
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ers worry more about smoking and attempt to reduce the danger
posed by the basic product by using a "safer" brand, is of no inter-
est to the manufacturer that runs such an advertisement. Even if
the natural cigarette campaigns reduces the overall number of
smokers by convincing marginal smokers that cigarette smoking
should be approached with caution, the purveyors of "natural"
brands expect to come out ahead.
Manufacturers that sell only safety-related complements to
risky activities also have incentives to heighten consumer fears,
even though doing so reduces sales of the underlying product. For
example, manufacturers of bicycle helmets want to encourage cy-
clists to believe that their activity poses real risks that can be alle-
viated through the purchase of helmets. Increasing the perceived
dangers associated with cycling surely discourages some people
from engaging in the activity who consequently would not buy a
helmet, but it might increase the sales of helmets overall. If the
manufacturer of the safety precaution is completely successful,
then people will be completely unwilling to engage in the activity
without their precaution. This could increase the cost of the activ-
ity, if the precaution is an inefficient one, but the manufacturer of
the precaution is still better off. Similarly, the depiction of a hor-
rific car accident by a medical-equipment manufacturer might dis-
courage driving, but it also sells their equipment (presumably by
encouraging people to pressure hospitals into purchasing such
devices).
As noted earlier, the incentives for manufacturers to exagger-
ate risk will be tempered somewhat by the elasticity of demand for
the underlying product. Manufacturers who consider heightening
consumer fears must realize that this tactic will also unavoidably
increase the perceived costs of all such products. If demand for the
basic product is highly elastic, then the overall gain in market
share that a manufacturer realizes by frightening consumers
might be offset by the decrease in the overall market for the basic
product. This analysis supports the casual, unscientific observa-
tion that manufacturers of precautions against unavoidable risks
(or products with highly inelastic demand functions) are more
likely to rely on advertising campaigns that emphasize risk.
The new rhetoric supporting EL seems to assume that manu-
facturers always behave as monopolists, attempting to expand the
20001 247
248 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:213
sales of the underlying product. 120 Most industries are competi-
tive, and grabbing more market share is no less valuable to a firm
than expanding the underlying market for the basic product. In
many cases, manufacturers can capture greater market share for
their brands by overstating the risks the basic product poses. The
benefits of such expanded market share might easily outweigh the
overall market reduction created by such a campaign especially if
the underlying demand for the product is highly inelastic.
Furthermore, even apart from manufacturers, our society in-
cludes important entities that benefit from increasing consumer
fear of products. These include public-interest consumer advo-
cates, plaintiffs attorneys, hospitals, insurance companies, politi-
cians who adopt consumer rights as one of their issues, consumer-
information media outlets (such as Consumer Reports) and the me-
dia in general. Although the budgets and influence of consumer
advocates and consumer information outlets are dwarfed by the
power of manufacturer marketing, politicians and the media have
considerable influence. Politicians have great access to the public
and large advertising budgets of their own. The media also have a
tremendous ability to influence the public. These entities fre-
quently use cognitive biases to heighten public fears.121 As just
one example, consider that the general public's fears over the dan-
gers of silicon-gel breast implants may have been inspired almost
entirely by a single television news-magazine report, which re-
sulted in billion-dollar lawsuits and bankruptcy for a Fortune 500
company, even though most scientists agree that no credible evi-
dence supported the conclusion that silicon-gel implants pose any
danger. 122 Manufacturers can sometimes find themselves utterly
powerless to dispel consumer fears in the face of extensive media
coverage and politically motivated attacks.
B. The Undesirable Effects of EL on Incentives for
Manufacturers to Increase Consumer Perceptions of Risk
Complaining that manufacturers over-sell safety precautions
might seem callous, but selling an excess of safety generates unde-
120. We especially thank Professor Keith Sharfman for this observation.
121. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein,Availability Cascades and Risk Reg-
ulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 683, 736-46 (1999).
122. See David E. Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 Cal. L. Rev, 457,
467-69 (1999).
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sirable social costs. Even if things are made safer, the costs of ex-
cessive safety are wasteful and over-selling safety may actually
make things less safe. Marketing campaigns that exacerbate con-
sumer fears might inadvertently encourage consumers to avoid rel-
atively safer activities and substitute relatively more dangerous
ones. For example, a campaign designed to make cyclists purchase
helmets might convince consumers that cycling is too dangerous,
thereby leading former cyclists to undertake a more dangerous
sport such as skiing (or worse, abandon physical sports and fill
their recreational time with sedentary activities that leave them
vulnerable to health problems). Also, for activities that cannot be
avoided, products accompanied by an excess of safety precautions
tend to be more cumbersome and less useful. For example, some
kinds of bulky, heavy-weight bullet-proof vests make officers virtu-
ally impervious to gunfire, but render them physically unable to
accomplish their jobs. 123 If EL encourages these practices-and
we argue in this section that it does-it has to be regarded as a
wasteful and undesirable reform.
1. EL Would Not Reduce Consumer Willingness to Buy
Excessive Product Safety
A superficial analysis suggests that EL might ameliorate man-
ufacturers' incentives to over-sell safety. 1. Because EL provides
consumers with insurance coverage for injuries caused by any
product, consumers arguably have no reason to purchase safety
precautions against product-related injuries. 2. EL provides con-
sumers with insurance against such injuries and rational consum-
ers could therefore ignore manufacturers' efforts to frighten them
into buying excessive safety precautions.
This analysis, however, relies on implausible assumptions
about both consumers and the EL system. For starters, it assumes
that consumers would be aware that the EL system provides ex-
tensive insurance. This is a remarkable logical flaw in the new
rhetoric: the same consumers who fail to understand their own at-
titudes towards risk and whose behavior is subject to manipulation
123. The new Restatement acknowledges that the determination of whether a
product is defective requires a full analysis of the various pros and cons associated
with each design alternative. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 2(b)
cmt. f. For an analysis of the bullet-proof vest dilemma, see Henderson & Twerski,
supra note 17, at 488.
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by manufacturers, somehow manage to understand that the legal
system will compensate them for any injuries products cause. We
doubt this is an accurate portrait of consumer behavior. If any-
thing, consumers have far less information about the legal system
than any other aspect of product-related risks. Not only might con-
sumers remain unaware of the insurance aspects of the system,
manufacturers attempting to scare consumers into buying safety
precautions might be able to convince them that the EL system
would not provide them with adequate compensation. The same
consumers who are supposedly being duped by manufacturers re-
garding the risks products pose cannot, at the same time, be ex-
pected to understand the legal system accurately.
Furthermore, no EL system can fully compensate consumers
for all of the harm that products cause. Full compensation would
require that the system grapple with non-market assets such as
life and limb. No tort remedy really fully compensates a parent for
the loss of child or a maimed accident victim for the loss of a limb.
Neither would it be possible for a tort system to offer an adequate
sum for damages so as to make someone truly indifferent between
the size of the damages and the injury. Psychological research sug-
gests that the amount that people would be willing to accept to
endure extreme injuries ex-ante is much greater than the amount
that people would be willing to pay to restore themselves to full
health ex-post.124 Because the legal system always operates ex-
post, it will chronically under-compensate victims relative to the
ex-ante value people place on life and limb. 125 Indeed, EL's propo-
nents do not suggest that the system should compensate for all
losses, and propose instead a system based on a worker-compensa-
tion model.' 26 Even if consumers understood such as system, they
would still be willing to purchase further safety precautions.
Intuitively, it seems unlikely that a consumer, worried about
protecting life and limb would be willing to ignore safety concerns
because the legal system promises some inadequate financial com-
pensation if injury should occur. The above analysis further sug-
gests that it would not be rational for them to ignore their fears
and rely on manufacturers to make them whole if they are injured.
124. See Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives
on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1341, 1353-54 (1995).
125. See id.
126. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 19, at 1567.
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Thus, EL would neither assuage consumer fears nor inhibit manu-
facturers' ability to exploit those fears.
2. EL Would, Compared with Traditional Tort Law, Actually
Increase Consumer Demand for Excessive Safety
Precautions
In fact, EL would enhance manufacturers' abilities to over-sell
safety. As an insurance system, EL would mean that a safer ver-
sion of a product would reduce a manufacturer's liability, even if
the extra safety is inefficient. Under EL, the excessive safety pre-
caution adds costs to the product, but also confers some savings on
the manufacturer by reducing liability. By contrast, under a fault-
based system, manufacturers do not pay for the cost of the acci-
dents if they incorporate at least the efficient level of care and so
an extra expenditure on precautions is just an additional expense.
As a result, adopting EL would narrow the gap in price between an
efficiently safe product and a product that incorporates an excess
of safety precautions. 127 It is precisely this effect that EL's new
proponents advance as a benefit of the system-the monetary price
of the product under EL would perfectly reflect all of its costs, mak-
ing it more likely that consumers will purchase safer products.
This feature of EL, however, also facilitates exploitation of
consumers by purveyors of excess safety. If consumers are com-
pletely ignorant (or suspicious) of the operation of the EL system
(ignorance and suspicion that purveyors of safety can encourage
with their advertising), then consumers would count the costs of
the accidents associated with the efficiently safe products twice:
first, when manufacturers of efficiently safe products include the
costs of the accidents that these products cause in the purchase
price; and second, when consumers, ignorant of the legal system,
act as if they will have to bear the costs of the accidents that effi-
ciently safe products cause.
Consider a numeric example to illustrate this point. Imagine
that a product can be made with two different designs: design one
costs $80 to produce per unit, but causes $10 in expected accident
127. Of course, a fully informed, fully rational consumer would consider the
harm that products cause, whether or not compensated, as part of the real (as
opposed to monetary) price and perceive no difference in the real price of products
under either fault-based liability or EL. The premise of new rhetoric supporting
EL, however, is that the rational model does not accurately describe consumers.
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costs; design two costs $95 to produce and causes no accidents.
Further suppose that the accident costs do not vary with the type
of consumer or consumer use and assume away valuation problems
with injury to life and limb. Design two is inefficiently safe, as it
incorporates a $15 cost to save $10 in accidents. A rational con-
sumer with perfect information would prefer to purchase design
one, regardless of whether the law incorporates EL or fault-based
liability. Under fault-based liability, manufacturers would use de-
sign one, charge $80 for the product, and would not be liable for
any harm the product caused (assuming they properly warned con-
sumer of the accident risk). The new proponents of EL argue that
the manufacturer would try to induce consumers to underrate or
disregard the expected $10 accident cost that accompanies the
product. EL would remedy that by forcing manufacturers to insure
against these accidents, thereby raising the price the manufactur-
ers charge for the efficient design to $90-eliminating the otherwise
hidden cost of accidents. Under either an EL or fault-based sys-
tem, the inefficient design costs $95, as it entails no accident costs.
EL effectively narrows the price gap between the two designs from
$15 to $5. If consumers fail to understand that the EL system of-
fers them insurance, they might factor some or all of the cost of
accidents entailed by design one into their purchasing decision,
thereby making design one seem like it costs $100. As a result,
consumers would prefer design two. Because EL narrows the price
gap between the designs, it makes consumers more vulnerable to
efforts to over-sell safety.128
Even if consumers would completely understand the EL sys-
tem, they would also be aware of the system's limitations. All pro-
posed EL systems leave some injured consumers with some
uncompensated injuries. Purveyors of excessively safe versions of
products will find it easier to convince consumers to spend a little
extra on safety under an EL system because the EL system nar-
rows the price gap between efficiently safe and excessively safe
products. In effect, because excessive safety reduces manufactur-
128. Of course, if the purveyors of the inefficiently safe design were to induce
consumer to believe that the efficient design is much more dangerous than is the
case, they might be able to convince consumers to purchase the inefficiently safe
product under any system. The point here, however, is that by narrowing the price
gap, EL makes their efforts a little easier.
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ers' liability costs under EL, the net costs of excess safety to manu-
facturers are less than they would be otherwise.
C. Asymmetric Manipulation of Consumers
Probably the most clever rhetorical move EL's new proponents
make is their assertion that the attractiveness of EL does not de-
pend upon whether consumers tend to overestimate or underesti-
mate risk.129 Hanson and Kysar are responsible for this assertion
and argue that consumers overestimate and overreact to risk
under some circumstances, and underestimate and under-react to
risk under other circumstances. 130 They contend that manufactur-
ers, through quasi-empirical marketing techniques such as focus
groups or test-marketing of products, will ferret out methods of en-
suring that consumers will underestimate and under-react to the
risks that their products pose. This argument neatly sidesteps a
long debate about overestimation and underestimation that has for
decades confounded scholars who attempted to use psychological
research to assess products liability.131
Though this argument is clever, it is misleading. As observed
earlier, some manufacturers struggle to convince consumers that a
product-related activity is dangerous while their competitors
struggle to convince consumers that the same activity is safe. It
would be naive to assume that the competing efforts of manufac-
turers who attempt to dampen consumers' fears invariably cancel
the efforts of manufacturers who attempt to heighten them. In
some contexts, it will be easier to augment fear than to dampen it,
and vice-versa.
Determining which conditions make consumers susceptible to
which biases is surely a messy and difficult empirical chore. Nev-
ertheless, it is an essential prelude to abandoning the central fea-
ture of products-liability law. Because manufacturers have
incentives both to overstate and understate risk, and each is so-
cially costly, it is necessary to determine which effect is more likely
and which is more costly before endorsing a reform. Clever rhetor-
ical moves notwithstanding, the debate between those who believe
129. See Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 19, at 721-24.
130. See id.
131. See id.
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consumers overreact to risk and those who believe consumers
under-react to risk cannot be avoided.
In the main, overreaction to risk is probably easier to en-
courage than under-reaction. Many cognitive processes foster
overestimates of the probability of an accident. Vivid examples of
horrific accidents and tragedies remain cognitively "available" for
relatively long periods of time, leading people to overestimate the
likelihood that such events will recur.132 Some low-probability
hazards so closely fit the prototype of dangerous activities that
people assume that they are dangerous when they are not.133 Af-
ter a disaster occurs, people, in hindsight, tend to believe that ex-
perts should have been able to predict and avoid it, which thereby
undermines trust in experts who manage complicated technologi-
cal hazards.13 And, psychologists have repeatedly shown that
people overreact to low-probability events.135
Furthermore, human emotional responses that facilitate over-
reaction to risks are more powerful and more common than ones
that lead people to ignore risk. For example, mental illnesses that
involve chronic overreaction to danger, such as post-traumatic
stress disorder and phobias, lack any counterparts involving
chronic underreaction. 136 Similarly, although excessive anxiety
underlies dozens, if not hundreds, of diagnosed mental disorders,
only one (sociopathy) involves chronic under-reaction to danger.
Even depression is often characterized by states of extreme anxi-
ety.137 The human brain seems, on the whole, built to overreact to
risk rather than to casually disregard risk. Indeed, it would be re-
markable if any species survived the evolutionary process by per-
sistently under-reacting to risk.
To be sure, this common tendency to overreact to risk is
counteracted by some psychological phenomena that lead people to
132. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 121, at 730-33.
133. See Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Judged Frequency of Lethal Events, 4 J. Ex-
per. Psychol.: Hum. Learning & Memory 551 (1978).
134. See Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past. Heuristics
and Biases in Hindsight, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
335, 339-43 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
135. See Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk,
in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 463, 465-72 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
136. See Martin E. Seligman & David L. Rosenhan, Abnormal Psychology 217-
18 (1994).
137. See id. at 157.
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understate or ignore risk. People are overconfident in their assess-
ments of their own likelihood of surviving an accident, particularly
when they have some control over the circumstances that might
produce an accident l38 People also rationalize their own volun-
tary exposures to risk, generally by coming to believe that such
risks are not dangerous.13 9 As a result of these combined effects,
people engage in one of two responses to risk: alarmist overreac-
tion (take precautions, better safe-than-sorry), or complete neglect
(out-of-sight, out-of-mind). 140
Manufacturers clearly have the capacity to distract people's
natural tendency to overreact, but overreaction is a very powerful
and widespread phenomenon. In other contexts, legal scholars ar-
gue that it is easy to facilitate public overreaction to health
hazards. 141 Administrative law is filled with examples of publicly
supported over-regulation of low-level hazards. 142 Although a
careful empirical study of a particular product, or type of product,
might reveal that consumers generally under-react to risk or be-
come easily distracted from it, without such an assessment, psy-
chological research cannot support EL.
V. CONCLUSION
The new proponents of EL attempt to claim the intellectual
high ground by asserting that anyone who opposes EL must have
failed to take psychological research seriously. We disagree; it is
EL's new proponents who fail to take the debate seriously. Their
argument fails to provide a serious quantitative assessment of the
extent of market manipulation. It fails to seriously consider ex-
isting products-liability law's efforts to address manufacturer ma-
nipulation of consumers and it fails to take seriously the practical
implications of implementing EL. The new rhetoric itself fails to
take the cognitive psychological research seriously inasmuch as it
138. See Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 19, at 656-58 (reviewing literature on
optimism).
139, See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Wages of Risk, 6 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y
673, 691-92 (1997).
140. See Howard Margolis, Dealing With Risk: Why the Public and the Experts
Disagree on Environmental Issues 76 (1996).
141. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 121, at 691-703.
142. See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk
Regulation 24-27 (1993).
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ignore manufacturers' ability to induce consumers to overreact to
risk.
EL's new proponents correctly recognize that the psychological
research on judgment and choice generally supports the notion
that consumers lack fixed preferences because preferences are con-
structed on the spot to suit particular decision-making tasks. 143
They also rightly note that this observation about consumer behav-
ior generally refutes extreme notions of consumer sovereignty.
Psychological research supports the proposition that, in their ef-
forts to satisfy their desires, people commonly make mistakes and
often have no real sense of what their desires are in the first place.
This makes them more vulnerable to manipulation than suggested
by conventional economic models of consumer choice, which as-
sume that people have relatively fixed preferences. Nevertheless,
the observation does not support EL.
The chief mistake made by EL's newer advocates lies in over-
simplifying the lessons of cognitive psychology. The psychological
research does, generally speaking, support paternalistic or quasi-
paternalistic legal reforms such as EL, that are designed to protect
people from themselves. 144 This general tendency must be treated
with some nuance and context, however, as it is more compelling in
some circumstances than others. Psychology's support for pater-
nalism must also be weighed against other, non-psychological con-
cerns.145 Furthermore, rational-actor models of human behavior
have proven enormously valuable and stunningly accurate for
most purposes and should not be discarded without solid evidence
that they have failed. Finally, the courts and the legislatures, with
centuries of experience, are entitled to some respect on psychologi-
cal issues. Those who would use psychology to advance reforms
should carefully consider the possibility that the law has already
noted the existence of the psychological phenomena and developed
suitable, if unavoidably imperfect, responses.
143. See generally Paul Slovic, The Construction of Preference, 50 Amer.
Psychol. 364 (1995) (outlining the process of preference construction and how deci-
sion-making is generally spur of the moment rather than derived from previously
established preferences).
144. See Rachlinski, supra note 22, at 763; Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analy-
sis of Law, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1997).
145. See Robert A. Hillnan, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal
Analysis: The Case of Liquidated Damages, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 717, 737-38 (2000).
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With these caveats in mind, we suggest that cognitive psychol-
ogy supports reforms which are less drastic than the wholesale
adoption of EL in products cases. First, in those situations in
which psychological research indicates that consumers under-react
to the risk that products pose, and the products pose "roulette-
style" harm that consumers cannot control, 146 forms of EL may be
appropriate. Cigarettes represent the most obvious example of
these circumstances. The dangers that they pose trigger both cog-
nitive dissonance and over-optimism more so than the cognitive bi-
ases that result in overreaction to risk. Also, the fact that
consumers can do little to control the harm that cigarettes cause,
other than by avoiding the product altogether, reduces the moral
hazard problem. It is perhaps not surprising that EL's new propo-
nents have focused almost exclusively on cigarettes, as they pre-
sent the best case for EL.' 47 It is unclear whether many other
products also satisfy these conditions.
A second reform supported by lessons from cognitive psychol-
ogy would be to restrict advertising. The principal source of social
harm identified by EL's new proponents is not the products them-
selves, but product advertising. Restrictions on advertising would
create far fewer unwanted side effects than would EL.14 Indeed,
the law seems ahead of the cognitive psychological research on this
point, having restricted advertising for cigarettes decades ago. If
the cognitive psychological research can be said to have taught us
more about the evils of advertising, then surely increased restric-
tions on advertising make more sense than an expensive, difficult
system of EL.
Finally, we cannot help but note that although EL's new advo-
cates claim to have embraced cognitive psychology and taken it se-
riously, in truth they hold closely to a conventional economic
analysis of product-related risk. For example, Hanson and Kysar
argue that "manufacturers' manipulative practices may inflate
consumers' perceptions of a product's overall desirability," and the
146. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 2(c)(3).
147. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 19, at 1467. See also id. at 1560 ("No
product illustrates our position more acutely than do cigarettes.").
148. Assuming that such restrictions on advertising would be consistent with
the First Amendment. See generally 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S.
484 (1996) (finding that Rhode Island's law banning truthful and accurate adver-
tising about alcohol content and retail prices is a violation of speech protected by
the first amendment).
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"consumers' misperception [that this manipulation creates] would
result in inefficient purchases."149 If consumer preferences are
completely constructed, then what exactly is supposed to be the
efficient level of consumption? Should the socially optimal demand
for soup be measured with the cans in alphabetical order, or not?
On a rainy day, or sunny? With what kind of music or ambient
odors (if any) in the background? In what section of the store?
What should the labels look like? How big are the cans? Risk is no
different. The slight risk of death from skiing creates part of the
sport's pleasure whereas the slight risk of death from exposure to a
nearby hazardous waste dump creates a massive uproar. The no-
tion that manufacturers distort consumer risk-perception assumes
that there is some natural and appropriate risk-benefit assessment
from which manufacturers lead consumers astray. If we take seri-
ously the psychological proposition that all preferences are con-
structed, then there is no magical correct level of risk that
consumers should endure.
Altering the legal regime would likely alter the level of risk
manufacturers offer in their products. Whether the new levels of
risk would be "better" in some sense, requires a definition of "bet-
ter." Not finding one in psychology, EL's new proponents resort to
an economic definition, using terms like "efficient" and "socially op-
timal." These terms are foreign to the psychological world of con-
structed preferences. The new rhetoric alternately relies on
psychology and economics when each supports EL. A complete, se-
rious assessment of what cognitive psychology means for products-
liability has yet to be undertaken.
149. Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 19, at 1566-67.
